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[The labor force in Taiwan] is the best bargain in Asia, if not the
world, when efficiency as well as cost is taken into account. And
the island's workers are well disciplined; there is practically none
of the costly labor strife that characterizes industries in many
parts of the world. There are no strikes.
(From advertisement: "Free China Salutes America's Bicentennial,"
New York Times, July 4, 1976, at 20).
I. INTRODUCTION
The economic "miracle" experienced in the Republic of China
("ROC") on Taiwan is an outstanding example of the successful pur-
suit of export-oriented economic growth. Taiwan's gross national prod-
uct ("GNP") increased by an average of almost 10 percent a year from
1961 to 1981.1 In spite of a recession in the early 1980s, the rate of
growth averaged 8.5 percent for the decade, and returned to 10 percent
in 1987. This high rate of economic growth produced a U.S. $19 billion
trade surplus in 1987, with total foreign exchange reserves in excess of
* Jane Kaufman Winn is currently an associate with Shearman and Sterling in
New York City. She served as a law clerk in Taipei, Taiwan in 1986 and received a
J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1987. The author would like to thank the Harvard
Club of the Republic of China for the fellowship which made the research for this
article possible.
1. S. Kuo, THE TAIWAN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 137 (1983).
(35)
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U.S. $75 billion by early 1988.2 Even more remarkable than the record
of Taiwan's national aggregate economic development is the fact that
this development has been achieved with increased equality in the dis-
tribution of income.8 Unlike in its neighbor South Korea, industrializa-
tion in Taiwan has not been accompanied by violent repression of labor
movements or clashes between workers and the authorities.4 Neverthe-
less, the Nationalist Party ("Kuomintang" or "KMT") regime in Tai-
wan has relied upon authoritarian, paternalistic industrial policies to
exclude workers from the political process. As a result, workers are de-
nied the opportunity to form free trade unions while working to maxi-
mize export-led growth and overseas investment in Taiwan.
A. ROC Government Policy on Labor
The export-oriented growth policies followed in countries like Tai-
wan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore in their successful pur-
suit of rapid industrialization are often contrasted with the import-sub-
stitution policies pursued in Latin American countries which are now
notable for their lack of success.' The import-substitution policies of
the Latin American nations, however unsuccessful they have been in
achieving the economic transformation of the nations pursuing them,
do not require internationally competitive labor costs as a basis for
growth. Nations which pursue economic growth by stimulating con-
sumption in their domestic markets have an incentive to maintain the
purchasing power of the working class.6 In countries pursuing export-
oriented growth policies, like Taiwan, the connection between domestic
purchasing power and industrial production was not present. In the
newly industrialized countries of East Asia, economic development was
2. FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 11, 1988, at 48, 73.
3. Kuo, RANIS AND FEI, THE TAIWAN SUCCESS STORY: RAPID GROWTH WITH
IMPROVED DISTRIBUTION IN THE ROC 1952-1979 (1981).
4. FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 3, 1986, at 46.
5. BALASSA, BUENO, KUCZYNSKI AND SIMONSEN, TOWARD RENEWED ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA (1987).
6. This corresponds to the philosophy underlying the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-166 (1982), as stated in § 1:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organ-
ized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens
and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business de-
pressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and work-
ing conditions within and between industries. [emphasis added]
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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based on exports of inexpensive manufactured goods, which in turn de-
pended on a low cost, disciplined, politically quiescent workforce."
Control over the industrial workforce of Taiwan has been achieved
and maintained by various techniques. In 1949, when civil war was
raging on mainland China between the Communists and the KMT,
martial law was declared in Taiwan. Following the Communist victory
in 1949, the KMT regime fled from the mainland to Taiwan, bringing
with it a body of repressive labor legislation enacted in the 1930s. The
regulation of the labor market in Taiwan, however, has not been
achieved by direct central government control or repression. ROC au-
thorities control the labor market indirectly, by supporting the author-
ity of management at the enterprise level.' Control over the industrial
workforce in Taiwan has been facilitated in part because of structural
characteristics of the labor market. Many of the light industrial jobs in
the export sector pay low wages, provide minimal job security, require
low skill levels and offer little possibility of advancement. Many of
these jobs are filled by young, unmarried women who participate in the
industrial workforce for only a few years.'
Since 1949, the United States has exercised considerable influence
over ROC economic policies. Taiwan was seen as significant for U.S.
military policies aimed at controlling Communist expansion in the Far
East. Following the outbreak of the Korean War and throughout the
1950s and 1960s, the U.S. provided the KMT regime on Taiwan with
enormous amounts of military and economic aid, and pressed for the
adoption of export-oriented economic policies.1" While U.S. foreign pol-
icy toward the ROC on Taiwan tended to support the economic pros-
perity of the island, no effort was made to prevent the exploitation of
the workers. The high level of investment by multinational corporations
in Taiwan's export industries, including many U.S. companies, has
been motivated in large part by investors' desire to exploit the plentiful
cheap labor in an atmosphere of political stability which is guaranteed
by an authoritarian regime. It was not until 1984 that official U.S. pol-
icy addressed the issue of the exploitation of workers in developing
7. Deyo, State and Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Develop-
ment, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 183 (F. Deyo
ed. 1987).
8. Id. at 187.
9. Galenson, The Labor Force, Wages and Living Standards, in ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN TAIWAN 391 (W. Galenson ed. 1979); Deyo,
supra note 7, at 194.
10. GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE 67-73 (1986).
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countries like Taiwan, which received substantial U.S. economic aid."
The system of government of the ROC on Taiwan is only nomi-
nally democratic. Soviet support given to the KMT in the early 1920s
is still visible in the authoritarian, one-party state in power on Taiwan
today. Winckler, a political scientist, characterized the KMT rule
through the early 1980s as "gerontocratic-authoritarian" because the
reigns of power are firmly held by an aging technocratic and military
elite of KMT members who fled mainland China following the Chinese
Communist Party ("CCP") victory in 1949.12 Winckler believes this
regime is slowly being modified into a "softer" authoritarian rule which
allows younger technocrats and Taiwanese greater participation in the
ruling elite."3 Within such a regime, political institutions serve to co-opt
politically active members of society into the party machine and repress
any agitation which cannot be co-opted.'" Economic and political lead-
ership within Taiwan is concentrated in the hands of a limited number
of party members whose legitimacy, in theory, depends on their oft-
stated intention to recover mainland China from Communist control. In
practice, however, their legitimacy depends in large part on the suc-
cessful economic policies they have pursued for the past thirty years.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, considered the father of the modern Chinese na-
tion, believed a period of tutelage would be necessary to prepare the
Chinese people for full democracy.'6 This theory provides one justifica-
tion for the paternalism of ROC leadership. Paternalism is further jus-
tified by the preoccupation of Chinese governments since the 1911
Revolution with achieving rapid economic development to safeguard
China's national integrity against foreign encroachments. The interest
of individual workers in the development of independent labor organi-
zations is repeatedly subordinated to the national economic goals of re-
construction and development. "Harmonious" labor-management rela-
tions are seen as a necessary contribution by working people to the
larger national good.' 6 Independent labor organizations and genuine
11. See infra notes 144-164 and accompanying text.
12. Winckler, Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to
Soft Authoritarianism? 99 CHINA Q. 481 (1984).
13. Id. at 482. In 1949, about 1.5 million refugees came to Taiwan from the
mainland. Today, approximately 85% of the 19 million people living on Taiwan are
native Taiwanese and the majority of the remainder are from the mainland. Originally,
Taiwanese and mainlanders were sharply divided by differences in dialect and occupa-
tion. These distinctions are fading but remain important. Id.
14. Id. at 481.
15. FEURWERKER, MODERN CHINA 73 (1964).
16. LIANG YUNG-CHANG, THE KUOMINTANG AND THE CHINESE WORKER 6
(1954).
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collective bargaining are inconsistent with these policies. The policies
also presuppose a degree of direct government involvement in labor-
management relations, a concept which is foreign to the traditions of
organized labor in countries such as the United States.
The aging KMT leaders who came to Taiwan from mainland
China in 1949 perceive several potential threats to their continued con-
trol. One possible challenge to their authority is the desire of the native
Taiwanese for self-determination. Following the transfer of Taiwan
from Japanese to Chinese control after World War II, the Taiwanese
staged an uprising against the corrupt, repressive wartime KMT ad-
ministration. The uprising, violently suppressed, sowed the seeds of
Taiwanese resentment for mainlander rule. Taiwanese also resent the
monopolization of higher social and political positions by
mainlanders. 7
The possibility of a Taiwanese independence movement is per-
ceived as a serious threat to ROC security because it threatens KMT
rule. The People's Republic of China ("PRC") continues to press its
intention to reunite Taiwan with mainland China, by force if necessary.
The PRC announced its intention to retake Taiwan by force if any one
of several circumstances arises; one of which would be a declaration of
independence from China by the people of Taiwan.' ROC leadership
is therefore constrained not only by its policy of military preparedness
in order to retake the mainland, but also by the possibility of interven-
tion by the CCP should the political situation in Taiwan slip out of its
control. This concern is reflected in the National Security Law, which
replaced martial law, and includes a provision prohibiting any person
from advocating the division of the national territory. 9
The KMT pursues a variety of strategies to maintain domestic po-
litical stability. The administration of martial law by security forces
was an important technique for maintaining control. KMT strategy
does not, however, rely on repression alone. Taiwan's highly successful
land reform in the early 1950s legitimated KMT rule among the peas-
ant farmers. Since the 1970s, Taiwanese party members have been
17. Ya-Li Yu, Future Domestic Developments in the Republic of China on Tai-
wan, 25 ASIAN SURV. 1075, 1086 (1985).
18. Among the other circumstances that could provoke a Communist invasion are
a KMT alliance with the Soviet Union or the KMT waiting "too long" to begin negoti-
ations on reunification.
19. National Security Law, art. 2 provides in part that the constitutionally guar-
anteed right of freedom of assembly will not include the right to violate the Constitu-
tion, advocate communism or the independence of Taiwan. FAR E. ECON. REV., July
30, 1987, at 30.
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gradually introduced into the government bureaucracy, although main-
landers unquestionably remain in control. While mainlanders
predominate in the government bureaucracy and academia, Taiwanese
entrepreneurs willing to accept KMT rule are allowed considerable eco-
nomic freedom, and many have amassed considerable wealth. However,
while Taiwanese entrepreneurs enjoy much freedom, the KMT remains
intolerant of any organized activity, such as labor organization, which
might coalesce into a political activity.?
B. Authority and Law in Chinese Culture
The formal legal system of the ROC does not enjoy the same
prominent position within Taiwanese society that, for example, the le-
gal system enjoys in the United States. Laws and regulations often
seem only marginally relevant to developments in Taiwan. Actual con-
duct and events refer instead to social norms and political power which
exist outside the formal legal system. The interpretation of any statute
in the ROC is therefore subject to qualification because of the dimin-
ished authority of the legal system in general. The problem is particu-
larly pronounced in the field of labor law, however, where many politi-
cal and social factors combine to undermine the authority of the
statutory law.
The KMT brought to Taiwan a body of repressive labor legisla-
tion, including a prohibition on striking, enforceable under martial law
and by a statutory provision requiring all labor disputes to be mediated
and placing unions under government control and supervision. KMT
penetration of unions is important in controlling political dissent, but
direct KMT intervention in labor disputes is minimal. Conditions in the
labor market in Taiwan depend more on the management of small en-
terprises which make up a substantial part of Taiwan's industry.
20. In 1950, two labor union activists were imprisoned for allegedly conspiring to
overthrow the government and engaging in pro-communist activities. They were not
released until 1984. There was no evidence that either man had advocated or engaged
in violence, although both had protested the suppression of the 1947 uprising. In 1980,
a Chinese sociologist trained in the U.S. and interested in labor problems received a
fourteen year sentence for allegedly being a Communist spy. There was no evidence
that she engaged in espionage, but she was an outspoken critic of KMT policies and a
supporter of the unofficial opposition. Asia Resource Center, Petition to the G.S.P.
Subcommittee of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, at 4 (June 1, 1987)
[hereinafter Asia Resource Center Petition]. The Asia Resource Center Petition and
the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Technical, Salaried and Machine
Workers, Petition (June 1, 1987) [hereinafter IUE Petition] describe several recent
cases of attempts by ROC authorities to discourage the establishment of independent
unions by various forms of intimidation.
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Certain traditional Chinese values complement and reinforce
KMT rule and the authority of management in labor relations in Tai-
wan. The Confucian tradition emphasizes respect for authority and hi-
erarchy and is actively promoted in ROC schools. Confucian classics
emphasize the authority of parents, teachers and national leaders as
well as the duty of subordinates such as wives, children and subjects to
obey. Corresponding to the duty of obedience imposed on subordinates,
persons in positions of authority are expected to rule by virtuous exam-
ple and are expected to dedicate themselves to the paternalistic care of
their subordinates.
Confucian thought also emphasizes the importance of family and
personal relationships. Maintenance of harmonious family and social
relationships is considered the greatest virtue, while resort to formal
laws to maintain the social order is decadent and vulgar. Persons in
subordinate positions should be guided in their conduct by their sense
of "shame" while persons in positions of authority should be guided by
their education and highly developed sense of personal virtue. Even the
"Legalist" school of philosophy, which radically opposed the "Con-
fucian" school, emphasized law as a mechanism of social control which
could be used to increase the power of the state and to weaken feudal
opposition to a centralized monarchy. There is little or nothing in Chi-
nese tradition which corresponds to the modern Western preoccupation
with individual rights and the idea that law can be used to safeguard
the liberty of citizens against the tyranny of rulers. Even Dr. Sun Yat-
sen felt that in a Chinese form of democracy the Chinese ideas of obli-
gation and duty should be substituted for the Western liberal idea of
individual rights.21
Although legal codes existed in China for hundreds of years, codi-
fied law contained little more than a summary of criminal penalties for
highly antisocial acts. The substance of what might be considered civil
law was provided by local customary law. Formal law was used to con-
trol criminal behavior and reinforce the control of the central govern-
ment over the Chinese empire, but the family and personal relations
embodied in customary law were used as the primary basis for the so-
cial order. Law and punishment were applied primarily to the common
people, to supplement and reinforce their sense of "shame" and their
desire to follow the virtuous example set by their leaders. This combi-
nation has been called the "Confucianization" of the law. 2
21. SUN YAT-SEN, THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF PEOPLE 51 (China Cult. Serv.
trans. 2d ed. 1981).
22. T'UNG-TSU CH'U, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 267 (1961).
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The idea that legal regulations are vulgar and punitive and are
applicable only to the common people still seems to have influence in
Taiwan today. Furthermore, the traditional hierarchy which allowed
superiors complete discretion and required docile submission from in-
feriors complements the authoritarian style of KMT rule on Taiwan.
The generally underdeveloped state of the legal system in the ROC,
reinforced by a concentration of political power within a single political
party, a judiciary hemmed in by martial law and a shortage of lawyers
and enforcement personnel, guarantees that the legal system will not
provide a basis for challenging the existing distribution of power either
in government or in the work place. Although the legal system does not
effectively constrain the discretion of persons in positions of authority,
legal regulations in the ROC today still serve an important function:
controlling persons in subordinate positions.
The traditional Chinese contempt for legalism and preference for
informal personal relations is a factor contributing to the harmonious-
ness of labor and management relations in the ROC. ROC officials
(who concede that the prohibition on striking had by no means elimi-
nated all labor disputes in Taiwan) feel that the practice of informally
resolving labor disputes without reference to the statutory mechanisms
for mediation and arbitration of such disputes is due in part to the
Chinese preference for informal dispute resolution.2 3 This is a social
value which is often advanced as a major difference between Chinese
and Western attitudes toward dispute resolution. Moser, an American
anthropologist, questioned its validity when he found that the
Taiwanese villagers he observed were quite happy to litigate their dis-
putes as soon as a forum that was perceived as fair and neutral was
made available.24 He felt that the historical Chinese preference for in-
formal dispute resolution could reasonably be considered making a vir-
tue of necessity because of the inhospitable character of Chinese jus-
tice.25 Similarly in the labor context, the potentially severe penalties for
violating the restrictions on labor activities are clearly calculated to in-
crease the preference of workers for informal dispute resolution.
II. LABOR LAW IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Adopted in 1946, the present ROC Constitution provides a bill of
rights and guarantees several substantive economic rights and obliga-
23. Telephone interview with Fusen Hu, Labor Officer of the Coordination Coun-
cil for North American Affairs ("CCNAA") (August 1987).
24. MOSER, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN A CHINESE COMMUNITY 178 (1981).
25. Id.
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tions. Freedom of speech, freedom of association and the right to or-
ganize are protected. 26 Also guaranteed are the right to work and the
right of women and children to special protections while working, such
as restrictions on working at night or in dangerous places.27 Labor and
management are required by law to mediate disputes.28
A. Labor Union Law
The Labor Union Law ("LUL") was promulgated in 1929 and
revised in 1975, although all major provisions remain intact.29 Article 1
of the 1975 LUL makes the following statement of policy concerning
labor unions: "[Tihe purposes of a labor union shall be to protect the
rights and interests of workers, to advance the knowledge and skill of
workers, to develop productive enterprises and to ameliorate the liveli-
hood of workers."30 In fact, unions are able to provide their members
little more than supplementary social services. In Taiwan, unions do
not represent their members in genuine bargaining with their
employers.3
The right of unions to exist is explicitly recognized in the LUL.3 1
Government and defense industry employees, however, are prohibited
from forming a union.33 Unions are authorized to conclude, revise or
cancel collective agreements; to render vocational and educational as-
sistance and medical services to members; to support cooperative activi-
26. ROC CONST., arts. 8, 11 and 14 reprinted in REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A REFER-
ENCE BOOK 425 (1983).
27. Id., arts. 15 and 153.
28. Id., art. 154.
29. Labor Union Law (1929) [hereinafter LUL] reprinted as amended in MINIS-
TRY OF INTERIOR, LABOR LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 101-
120 (1987) [hereinafter LABOR LAWS].
30. LUL, supra note 29, art. i.
31. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT No. 268, LABOR LAW AND PRACTICE
IN TAIWAN, at 40-41 (1964); FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 26, 1987, at 56. See also,
Galenson, supra note 9, at 428.
Even in Japan, where the Labor Division of the Supreme Command of the Allied
Powers made great efforts after World War II to establish vigorous and independent
unions, the present situation is not much better. Japanese workers in practice have little
freedom to organize unions without a prior determination by management that a union
would be appropriate for the company. Union leadership is so closely integrated into
management that unions are unwilling to confront management on many issues. Japa-
nese union activities are concentrated more on recreational activities for workers than
on improving working conditions or raising wages. FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 3, 1986, at
45.
32. LUL, supra note 29, art. 2.
33. Id., art. 4.
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ties by members; and to help resolve labor-management disputes and
disputes between members and between unions. Unions are also re-
quired to compile statistical information about members. 4
Workers employed by enterprises with more than thirty workers
may form a union. 85 Businesses with thirty or fewer employees account
for 95% of the total in Taiwan and employ 70% of the work force. 8
Thus, only a small proportion of Taiwan's workers have a right to form
a union.
Any worker who is not in a supervisory or administrative position
representing management may join a union.3"The LUL provides for the
election of officers, the conduct of meetings and the proper use of oper-
ating funds. 88
Unions are divided into industry and craft unions. The appropriate
type of union for a work place is determined by the "authority in
charge."'39 The jurisdiction of a union coincides with the relevant ad-
ministrative jurisdiction, and only one labor union for each category of
activity may be organized in one jurisdiction. ° This is one indication
that unions in Taiwan have been reduced to the equivalent of govern-
ment agencies. These LUL provisions are reinforced by the Law Gov-
erning the Organization of Civic Bodies During the Extraordinary Pe-
riod, enacted in 1942, which permits only one organization per
34. Id., art. 5.
35. Id., art. 6.
36. Id., art. 6. Art. 8 provides that workers at two or more small enterprises may
join together to form a union; however, in practice the authorities do not permit the
formation of such joint unions. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COMMIT-
TEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN 1986, at 709 (1987)
[hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS].
37. Id., art. 13. Workers interviewed by an American anthropologist knew they
belonged to a union because union dues were deducted from their pay. None of them,
however, took any interest in the union or what it did. Kung, Perceptions of Work
Among Factory Women, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF TAIWANESE SOCIETY 184, 190
(Hearn and Gates, eds. 1981).
38. LUL, supra note 29, chs. IV, V and VI.
39. Id., art. 6. "Authority in Charge" is a term of art which eliminates the need
to make explicit that national, provincial and municipal authorities are all covered by a
statute. In the labor context in Taiwan, national unions are regulated by the national
government in Taipei and include the Seamen's, Railway Workers', Postal Workers'
and Miners' Unions. These unions form the Chinese Federation of Labor. The provin-
cial government of Taiwan is located in Taichung City and regulates the numerous
unions in the Taiwan Federation of Labor. Municipal and county authorities have con-
trol over unions with strictly local jurisdiction.
40. Id., arts. 7 and 8.
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associational function."'
Promulgation of the LUL followed closely the KMT purge of mili-
tants and communists from Chinese labor organizations, which began
in 1927. Its provisions represent the assertion of control by the authori-
ties over virtually every aspect of union organization and operation.
The original text of the LUL provided explicitly that no union could be
organized without application for permission from the competent au-
thority. Once permission to organize was granted, the union was re-
quired to report the names, addresses and a brief personal history of its
members to the authorities. The authorities had the power to review,
and if necessary, alter any part of a union's constitution, resolution or
election which the authority determined to be unlawful. The authorities
also had the power to dissolve any union which committed an unlawful
act or disturbed the peace."2 With only minor modifications, the
amended LUL contains the same provisions. 3
The LUL not only subjects unions to unlimited government inter-
ference and supervision, it contains severe limitations on the right of
unions to undertake collective action to further their members' inter-
ests. Workers are formally given the right to strike, but only when me-
diation has failed and a majority of members vote for a strike by secret
ballot in a general meeting of the union."" However, the labor dispute
legislation discussed infra, makes this "right to strike" meaningless.
Unions are forbidden to disturb the public peace or cause harm to
others during strikes. 5 More significantly, unions are forbidden to de-
mand an increase in wages in excess of the current "standard wage'. 46
Because the "standard wage" has never been defined, it is not clear
under what circumstances a union could legitimately strike to achieve
an increase in wages for its members.4 Wage demands have not been a
major issue in labor relations, however, because wages have risen in
line with the very substantial real economic growth Taiwan has exper-
ienced for the last thirty years."8
41. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 36.
42. Former LUL (1929), arts. 5, 28, 29 and 37 reprinted in A. WAGNER, LABOR
LEGISLATION IN CHINA 161 (1980).
43. LUL, supra note 29, arts. 3, 9, 30, 31 and 40.
44. Id., art. 26.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. A. WAGNER, supra note 42, at 112.
48. Manufacturing wages in Taiwan rose at an average rate of 16% a year for the
decade ending in 1984. This was made possible by an economy growing at a rate in
excess of 10% a year for the same period. The experience of workers in Taiwan con-
trasts with the experience of workers in Japan, who have suffered a loss of real income
19871
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The LUL provides some protections for workers against discrimi-
nation for union activities. The original text of the LUL provided that
an employer or his agent could not discriminate against a worker or
applicant based on union affiliation."9 An employer or his agent could
not require that members of a union give up their membership as a
condition of employment, nor dismiss employees during mediation or
arbitration.50 Following the 1975 amendments, the LUL now has provi-
sions governing how much time off with pay union directors are entitled
to take in order to handle union affairs.51 A new provision states that
an employer may not make it a condition of employment that a worker
will not hold office in a union."
Most unions in Taiwan are used by the government to convey so-
cial and economic policies to workers and management, in which case
these protections are not very significant.53 Furthermore, as employers
often take the initiative in organizing unions and selecting leadership,
the statutory protections have not kept unions free from management
domination.5 4 Official unions are not completely controlled by the gov-
ernment, however, and have recently voiced criticisms of the inability
of official unions to effectively represent their members in dealings with
management. Statutory protections are generally not extended to work-
ers who attempt to organize independent unions as an alternative to
official unions.55
B. Labor Disputes Law
Promulgated in 1928, the Labor Disputes Law ("LDL") was the
first major piece of labor legislation passed after the KMT split from
in recent years. FAR E. EcON. REV., Apr. 3, 1986, at 43.
49. Former LUL, supra note 42, art. 31.
50. Id., arts. 32 and 33.
51. LUL, supra note 29, art. 35.
52. Id., art. 36.
53. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 31, at 40-41; FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Feb. 26, 1987, at 56. According to one estimate, over 50% of union officials were KMT
members. Galenson, supra note 9, at 426.
54. Galenson, supra note 9, at 431.
55. AFL-CIO, Petition to the GSP Subcommittee of the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (June 1, 1987) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Petition]. The Asia Resource
Center Petition describes the prosecution of the representative of a non-KMT affiliated
union for trespassing when the representative entered the employer's premises on union
business. Both the Asia Resource Center Petition and the IUE Petition cite specific
instances of representatives of official unions assisting in government crackdowns on
independent labor activities.
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the Communist Party.56 That split permitted a shift to the right in
KMT policies. The LDL's provisions are generally interpreted to make
strikes impossible. Subsequent amendments in 1930, 1932 and 1943
have not substantially changed the LDL. In 1987, some further pro-
posed minor revisions are currently before the ROC Legislature.
The LDL applies only to private sector employees and employers
where there is a union or more than fifteen employees.5 7 In the event of
a labor dispute, the authority in charge has the power to call for a
mediation board to settle the dispute, acting at the request of one or
both parties, or on its own initiative. 8 Thus, if there is any indication
that a labor dispute might escalate into an undesirable confrontation,
the government authorities may intervene to compel mediation.
If mediation- fails, the dispute goes to arbitration.5 9 The LDL orig-
inally provided that if neither party disputed the arbitral award, it
would have the effect of a contract between the parties, or if labor was
represented by a labor union, a collective agreement.60 The LDL now
provides simply that no party to a labor dispute may take exception to
a decision of an arbitration board.6'
Mediation boards include representatives from management and
labor, as well as from the authority in charge." Arbitration boards in-
clude one representative each from management and labor, two repre-
sentatives from the competent authority and one from the local district
court.6 3
Workers and their organizations were, and still are, subject to a
blanket prohibition against closing factories, taking or damaging goods
or equipment at the work place, or "compel[ling] other workers to
strike." 4
The original text of the LDL provided that during mediation and
arbitration, employers could not suspend business operations or fire
workers.6 5 Current Article 36 provides that employers and workers at
non-state-owned public utilities may not suspend business or strike
56. The Settlement of Labor Disputes Law (1928) [hereinafter LDL] reprinted as
amended in LABOR LAWS, supra note 29, at 143.
57. Id., art. 1.
58. Id., art. 3.
59. Id., arts. 4 and 7.
60. Former LDL (as amended through 1930), art. 5 reprinted in A. WAGNER,
supra note 42, at 180.
61. LDL, supra note 56, art. 7.
62. Id., art. 9.
63. Id., art. 15.
64. Former LDL, supra note 60, art. 34; LDL, supra note 56, art. 37.
65. Former LDL, supra note 60, art. 33.
19871
48 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 12
under any circumstances. Other private sector employers and employ-
ees may not suspend business or call a strike while mediation or arbi-
tration is in progress or during a national emergency.66 It is unclear
whether, in spite of the repeal of martial law, it would still be possible
for a court to find that a "national emergency" exists. There has not
been a strike per se in Taiwan since 1949, so there is no evidence of
how a court would interpret this statutory provision.6 7
The LDL can be interpreted as prohibiting strikes because, in ef-
fect, it makes arbitration mandatory and binding, and forbids strikes
during mediation and arbitration. The prohibition on striking does not
rest, however, on this statutory construction alone. Article 14 of the
National General Mobilization Law gives authorities discretion to issue
orders to prevent or settle labor disputes, and to prohibit lockouts,
strikes, sitdowns or any other action prejudicial to production. The pen-
alty for failure to respect such orders is up to seven years imprisonment
and a fine.6 8
The Measures for Handling of Labor Disputes during the Period
of National Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion
("Measures"), promulgated by executive order under the authority of
the National General Mobilization Law, also reinforce the anti-striking
interpretation of provisions of the Labor Disputes Law. All disputes
must be submitted to binding arbitration, and workers and employers
are forbidden to engage in strikes, lockouts, or work slowdowns.69 The
purpose of the Measures is to maintain production during the period of
"suppression of the Communist rebellion." The oppressive effects on
workers of this blanket restriction on organized activity is modified by
the Labor Dispute Arbitration Boards' authority to investigate workers'
66. LDL, supra note 56, art. 36.
67. Although officially there have been no "strikes," there have been significant
organized activities by workers seeking improved pay or working conditions. Galenson,
supra note 9, at 428. The situation had apparently changed by early 1988 when there
was a three day strike at Ford Liao Liao Ho in Taiwan. Sunday Morning Post (Hong
Kong), Feb. 14, 1988, at 7. One problem in trying to determine the degree of worker
discontent is the reluctance of the press in Taiwan to cover such events. For discussion,
see infra notes 144-164 and accompanying text.
68. Provisional Statute for Punishment of Offenses Against National General Mo-
bilization, art. 5. ROC authorities emphasize that no administrative order suppressing
a strike has ever been issued by government authorities under this or other laws. This
assertion, even if true, does not address the question of whether this and similar stat-
utes, combined with Martial Law, are successful in suppressing labor unrest by their
chilling effect.
69. Measures for Handling of Labor Disputes During the Period of National Mo-
bilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion (1947), art. 7 and 8 reprinted in
A. WAGNER, supra note 42, at 158.
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living and working conditions. The authorities may "adjust[]" condi-
tions so that both production and the workers' standard of living are
maintained and disputes prevented."0 Both the Measures and the Na-
tional General Mobilization Law have remained in effect after the re-
peal of Martial Law, but it is possible they will be formally repealed in
the course of the present review by the government of all existing labor
legislation.
In 1996, proposed amendments to the LDL were drafted by the
Ministry of the Interior ("MOI") and approved by the Executive
Yuan. The proposed amendments are currently before the Legislative
Yuan and it is not clear how long it may take before they become law.
The proposed amendments make several procedural and formal
changes.7 First, labor disputes would be divided into disputes over
"rights" and disputes over "readjustments." "Rights" are defined by
law or contract, while "readjustments" are disputes which arise out of
working conditions not covered by law or statute.72 Disputes over read-
justments are subject to compulsory mediation and arbitration. 7 Dis-
putes over rights may be litigated in court, but only after compulsory
mediation and arbitration and after one party to arbitration has failed
to honor the terms of the arbitral agreement. The proposed amend-
ments authorize the creation of special labor courts, but these courts
would be limited in jurisdiction to the enforcement of terms of arbitra-
tion agreements.7 ' There is no change in the existing LDL provision
that there shall be no strikes during mediation or arbitration, or that
the results of arbitration are binding on the parties. The proposed
amendments do not seem to represent any progress towards granting
ROC workers the right to strike.
The express denial of civil court jurisdiction over labor disputes
before arbitration is completed and an arbitration agreement has been
implemented seems to be a response to increased litigation by workers
following promulgation of the Labor Standards Law in 1984. 71 The
70. Id., arts. 2 and 6.
71. The following discussion of the proposed amendments is based on an English
translation of the draft bill submitted to the Legislative Yuan on March 12, 1986,
provided by the CCNAA (the institution which represents ROC interests in the U.S.
which does not have diplomatic relations with the ROC).
72. Id., art. 4.
73. Id., art. 5.
74. Id., arts. 37 and 38.
75. For example, the Baker & McKenzie Taiwan Newsletter (April-June 1986)
mentions litigation in which an employee claimed he wag due over five times as much
in pension benefits as his employer had paid him. Baker & McKenzie, Taiwan News-
letter, Apr.-June, 1986, at 12.
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1984 general review of the Generalized System of Preferences by the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative found that this simplified
method of executing on labor obligations could be considered "taking
steps" towards increased recognition of labor rights in Taiwan.7 This
interpretation of the proposed provisions overlooks the possibility that
arbitration proceedings, and hence arbitration awards which would be
enforced by summary proceedings in a labor court, are biased in favor
of management.
C. Collective Agreement Law
Promulgated in 1930, the Collective Agreement Law ("CAL")
provides that all collective agreements must be submitted to the compe-
tent authority for approval." The competent authority can cancel or
amend any provision which is unlawful or "incompatible with the pro-
gress of the employer's business or is not suited to maintenance of the
workers' normal standard of living."'7 8 A collective agreement is defined
by the act as a written contract between an employer or employers'
association and a labor organization.7 9
Although the CAL purports to allow unions a say in the em-
ployer's choice in hiring, that privilege is effectively destroyed by the
exceptions to it. The result is that the closed shop is impossible in
Taiwan.
A collective agreement may specify that the employer hire only
members of a particular workers' organization; however, under speci-
fied circumstances, the employer is not bound by this provision in the
collective agreement. 80 A collective agreement may not require the em-
ployer to hire workers according to a rotation-hire list provided by the
workers' organization." Finally, the collective agreement may not re-
strict the employer's discretion in hiring or refusing to hire workers
76. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, General Review of the Genera-
lized System of Preferences - Worker Rights (undated memo). For a discussion of the
role of the U.S. Trade Representative in monitoring labor rights in Taiwan, see infra
notes 144-164 and accompanying text.
77. Collective Agreement Law (1930) [hereinafter CAL] reprinted as amended in
LABOR LAWS, supra note 29, at 132.
78. Id., art. 4.
79. Id., art. 1.
80. Id., art. 8. Some of these situations include dissolution of the workers' organi-
zation or inability of the workers' organization to provide the employer with sufficient
qualified personnel.
81. Id., art. 9.
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recommended by the workers' organization for employment.8"
D. Factory Law and Labor Standards Law
In the early twenties, both the warlord controlled government in
Peking and the KMT government in Canton made several attempts to
regulate working conditions in factories in response to political agita-
tion for reform. Even though these regulations were beyond the ability
of either government to enforce when they were issued, they later
formed the basis for the Factory Law ("FL"), promulgated in 1929.83
The FL addresses many types of issues: regulation of child labor,
health and safety standards, rates of insurance and disability compen-
sation, provisions for the creation of factory councils of management
and labor representatives, and terms and conditions of apprenticeship.
Minimum standards are set-for the terms and conditions of employ-
ment for all covered workers.
The provisions of the FL were expanded by the Labor Standards
Law ("LSL"), promulgated in 1984 after ten years of debate and con-
sideration by legislators and despite vocal opposition from employers.8 '
The promulgation of the LSL is an example of KMT technocrats' abil-
ity to diffuse popular discontent by making real concessions when nec-
essary. Despite ROC government intervention in labor relations to sup-
press the formation of independent labor organizations, KMT economic
policy makers also show their willingness to intervene to give workers
formal guarantees of minimum conditions of employment. In effect, the
FL and the LSL supply basic terms for employment contracts which
might have been reached in a collective bargaining process if indepen-
dent labor unions existed and could bargain with employers.8"
One of the greatest shortcomings of the LSL is that its guarantees
remain largely formal. The official policy encourages voluntary compli-
ance by management. Enforcement staff are too few to effectively po-
lice the large number of small manufacturing firms in Taiwan, and
penalties for violations are too light to intimidate recalcitrant employ-
ers. The problem is serious considering Taiwan's poor record for occu-
pational health and safety conditions.86
82. Id., art. 10.
83. Factory Law (1929) [hereinafter FL] reprinted as amended in A. WAGNER,
supra note 42, at 170.
84. Labor Standards Law (1984) [hereinafter LSLI reprinted in LABOR LAWS,
supra note 29, at 1.
85. The FL and LSL in some respects resemble the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
86. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 36, at 710; FAR E. EcON. REV., Sept. 6, 1984,
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- The LSL was intended to modernize the outdated FL. The target
date for the nullification of the FL was June 30, 1986. Following the
enactment of the LSL in 1984, however, the transition from the FL to
the new statute proved more difficult than originally expected. In par-
ticular, the MOI and employers conflicted in their interpretation of the
scope of the new retirement provisions of the LSL. As a result, in 1987
the FL still had not been repealed and it is unclear when it will be.
The scope of the FL was originally restricted to all factories using
mechanical power and regularly employing more than thirty workers. 87
The more than thirty workers requirement excluded most factories and
the term "mechanical power" was never clearly defined.88 While facto-
ries operating in foreign concessions often employ hundreds of workers,
native owned industry is usually undercapitalized and operates on a
much smaller scale. 89
One issue hotly debated prior to adoption of the LSL was how far
to expand the scope of the FL. The LSL covers agriculture, mining,
construction, utilities, transportation and communication industries
without specifying a minimum number of employees.9" According to
MOI estimates, 3.26 million employees, out of a work force of over
seven million, are now covered by the LSL. The manufacturing indus-
try is an important addition to the list of industries covered.91 Manu-
facturing in Taiwan is primarily conducted by small family businesses
which previously escaped any extensive regulation. Office workers and
catering industries are excluded from the scope of the law. In 1986, the
MOI proposed further expansion of the scope of the LSL to cover
workers in department stores, insurance companies and financial insti-
tutions. In 1987, this proposal remained before the Executive Yuan for
consideration and had not yet been submitted to the Legislative Yuan.
at 109. The shortage of legal and administrative agency personnel assigned to the en-
forcement of existing laws and regulations is compounded by a lack of effective tools
for enforcing regulations outside of specific provisions for fines. There is nothing in
ROC law which corresponds to the U.S. administrative law "cease and desist" order
which allows agency personnel to identify violations, issue warnings and prosecute those
failing to comply with the order.
87. FL, supra note 83, art. 1.
88. A. WAGNER, supra note 42, at 130-31.
89. Id. at 22.
90. Precisely which companies are covered by the LSL is determined by reference
to the authorized scope of business activities of a company which must be specified in
the certificate of incorporation. In the ROC, unlike the U.S., companies applying for
incorporation must request permission to engage in specified activities and must limit
their activities to those for which they have received authorization.
91. LSL, supra note 84, art. 3.
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The FL prohibited the employment of any children under the age
of fourteen. The law attempted to regulate the work that women, and
children aged fourteen to sixteen, could perform by forbidding work
that was dangerous or hazardous to health, including night work.92 The
LSL forbids employment of children under age fifteen and considerably
expands protections for pregnant female workers.93
The FL provided that authorities would set a minimum wage
based on conditions where the factory was located. 94 By the time the
new LSL was promulgated, a minimum wage for Taiwan as a whole
had been set by the MOI. In 1987, the rate was set at NT$6,900 a
month, based on a 48 hour week.95
The FL provided for the creation of factory councils containing
equal numbers of workers' and management representatives. The coun-
cils were supposed to promote efficiency, improve labor-management
relations, mediate disputes informally, improve safety precautions and
assist in the enforcement of collective agreements and factory rules. 6
The factory councils have been replaced by labor-management confer-
ences under the LSL.97 Labor-management conferences should occur
regularly and provide a substitute for adversarial collective bargaining.
The LSL includes several provisions which explicitly require that labor
and management agree on certain terms and conditions of employ-
ment.98 Labor-management conferences provide the forum for these
negotiations.
Labor-management conferences are not, however, an adequate
substitute for free, adversarial collective bargaining. In a recent news-
letter published by the Chinese Federation of Postal Workers, the
union president called for an end to one-sided labor-management rela-
tions. The union president claimed that part of the reason the labor
union was not effective in representing its members was that labor-
management conferences were rarely held.s
Adult workers under the FL were not required to work more than
92. FL, supra note 83, arts. 5, 6 and 7.
93. LSL, supra note 84, ch. V.
94. FL, supra note 83, art. 20.
95. This was up from NT$6,150 a month. China Post, Oct. 23, 1986, at 12. In
August 1987, the official rate of exchange was approximately New Taiwan $31 =
US$1.
96. FL, supra note 83, ch. X.
97. LSL, supra note 84, art. 83.
98. Id., arts. 32, 33 and 39.
99. AFL-CIO Petition, supra note 55, at 20. The U.S. State Department reported
that collective bargaining, although legal, does not take place in Taiwan. COUNTRY
REPORTS, supra note 36, at 705.
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eight hours a day, unless "local conditions or the nature of the work"
required it, in which case the limit was ten hours. 100 The LSL now
provides that an employer may exceed the normal working hours only
after agreement with the labor union or if a majority of the workers
consent.101 If circumstances such as seasonal variations, changing
shifts, or preparatory or supplemental activities require the normal
workday to be extended, the union or workers must also consent."0 2 The
provisions dealing with rest and leave similarly reflect improved condi-
tions for workers and increased participation by unions and workers
with a corresponding reduction in management discretion. 103 The LSL
also explicitly requires that labor and management agree on the issue
of wages.10 4
The FL prohibited employers from deducting from workers' wages
insurance against damages or breach of contract.1 0 5 This refers to a
practice which was common during the twenties and thirties when
many workers were peasants unaccustomed to factory industry.'0° The
LSL retains the provision. 07
The FL further provided that men and women performing the
same work with equal efficiency must be paid the same wage.108 The
LSL now also provides that an employer may not discriminate against
any worker because of sex. 09 Recent research indicates that this statu-
tory mandate bears little relationship to actual working conditions. In
1982, the average pay for female employees in Taiwan was only two
thirds the average pay for male employees.110 While many factors con-
tributed to this difference, such as different job descriptions and qualifi-
cations, men still received more than women even for approximately
equivalent work for equal productivity. 1
100. FL, supra note 83, art. 8. One observer found that employees were routinely
required to work overtime without compensation. Galenson, supra note 9, at 407.
101. LSL, supra note 84, art. 30.
102. Id., art. 32.
103. FL, supra note 83, ch. IV; LSL, supra note 84, ch. IV.
104. LSL, supra note 84, art. 22.
105. FL, supra note 83, art. 25.
106. A. WAGNER, supra note 42, at 22; FL, supra note 83, art. 25.
107. LSL, supra note 84, art. 25.
108. FL, supra note 83, art. 24.
109. LSL, supra note 84, art. 25.
110. Gannicott, Women, Wages and Discrimination: Some Evidence from Tai-
wan, 34 ECON. DEv. AND CULTURAL CHANGE 721 (1986).
111. Id. See also, Kung, supra note 37, at 184 (discussion of the cultural factors
discouraging Chinese women from seeking participation in the work force on equal
terms with men).
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Chapter II of the LSL has many new provisions setting out stan-
dard terms of a labor contract. Temporary and permanent employment
are distinguished. 112 Chapter II also provides for the conditions under
which an employer may dismiss an employee, as well as the amount of
notice and severance pay to which the dismissed employee is entitled."' 3
For example, a worker employed for less than one year is entitled to
ten days notice; a worker with more than one and less than three years
is entitled to twenty days notice; and with over three years, thirty days
notice."'
Chapter II also enumerates the types of misconduct for which an
employer may terminate the employee without advance notice. These
include damage to facilities or tools, excessive absences, violent or abu-
sive behavior, or violation of the labor contract.1 5 Conditions under
which an employee may terminate employment without advance notice
are also specified. These include violent or abusive behavior by the em-
ployer, work assignments detrimental to the worker's health, or failure
to pay wages according to the terms of the labor contract.116 All these
provisions enlarge upon provisions of the FL."7
Under the LSL, employers are not required to give advance notice
of termination and severance pay regardless of employee performance
if certain conditions arise. These include dissolution of the business,
running the business at a loss, or changing business conditions which
require workers to be laid off."' However, companies merely transfer-
ring ownership or in court-ordered reorganization must give the requi-
site advance notice and severance pay listed in Articles 16 and 17 of
the LSL to any employees terminated as a result of the transfer or
reorganization. 1 9 This provision was introduced following a period of
unprecedented business failures and company reorganizations in the
early 1980s, in which unpaid wage claims were a major issue.
The original FL contained provisions dealing with "workers' wel-
fare" and apprenticeship revealing the paternalistic attitudes govern-
ment and management had towards labor.12° Employers were exhorted
112. LSL, supra note 84, arts. 9 and 10.
113. Id., arts. 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18.
114. Id., art. 16.
115. Id., art. 12.
116. Id., art. 14.
117. FL, supra note 83, ch. VI.
118. LSL, supra note 84, art. 11. Art. 27 of the FL required that employers al-
ways give advance notice and severance pay to employees, but there is no evidence of
how rigorously this provision was enforced.
1 19. LSL, supra note 84, art. 20.
120. FL, supra note 83, ch. VII.
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to assist workers in cooperative ventures, encourage saving, teach illit-
erate workers to read and provide for "wholesome entertainment."' 1
Apprentices had a legal duty to be obedient and faithful to their in-
structors and diligent in their work. 2' The LSL contains no corre-
sponding provisions.
As the first major piece of legislation regulating terms and condi-
tions of industrial employment, the original FL contained a chapter on
safety and health and a chapter on medical, disability and death bene-
fits."' These were preempted in 1958 by the Labor Insurance Act
("LIA") which set up a form of workman's compensation."2 4 As
amended through 1979, the LIA provides both ordinary health insur-
ance and occupational health insurance. 2 5 The scope of coverage of the
LIA in some areas exceeds either the FL or the LSL. Although govern-
ment workers are covered under a government plan, the LIA includes
workers on contract to the government, office workers and employees of
non-profit enterprises with at least five employees.' 26
One new provision in the LSL is the creation of an Outstanding
Wage Settlement Fund ("OWSF").2 7 In response to the large number
of business failures in the early 1980s, legislators created the OWSF as
an insurance fund to pay up to six months of back wages if a business
fails.'2 8 The rate of contribution set by the authorities is 0.005% of
workers' salaries. 2 9 The first contributions were made in November
1986, and in February 1987, workers were entitled to make the first
claims on the OWSF. 30
A controversial provision of the LSL deals with pension benefits,
which are to be provided at the employers' expense.' 3' The attempt to
establish pensions for a large proportion of the work force in Taiwan
was one of the most radical changes introduced with the LSL. Before
the promulgation of the LSL and subject to an exception for the civil
service, very few employees in Taiwan were covered under any formal
pension plan. The traditional Chinese family is a close knit economic
121. Id., arts. 36, 38 and 39.
122. Id., art. 60.
123. Id., chs. VIII and IX.
124. Labor Insurance Act (1958) [hereinafter LIA], reprinted as amended in LA-
BOR LAWS, supra note 29, at 167.
125. Id., art. 2.
126. Id., art. 6.
127. LSL, supra note 84, art. 28.
128. Id.
129. Id.; China Econ. News Daily, Sept. 27, 1986, at 3.
130. China Econ. News Daily, Dec. 16, 1986.
131. LSL, supra note 84, ch. VI.
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and social organization. Children are expected to provide for their par-
ents in their old age and most workers in Taiwan relied on these family
ties instead of pensions.
Employer contributions to pensions and the OWSF are paid into
six designated local banks, which then transfer the assets to the Central
Trust of China.133 Some of the funds are used as capital for public
construction projects. 33The authorities' decision to retain the pension
assets within the central government is a reflection of the underdevel-
oped state of Taiwan's capital markets and official mistrust of equity
investments.
Before 1984, retirement benefits required by law were covered by
the Regulations Governing the Retirement of Factory Workers in Tai-
wan Province ("Regulations"). Employers previously exempt from pen-
sion requirements under the Regulations but now covered by the LSL
vigorously resisted the MOI's interpretation of the new pension benefit
provisions of the LSL.134 The MOI's interpretation of the LSL required
that pension benefits be calculated as of the date of employment, re-
gardless of whether or not the employee had previously been covered by
the Regulations.1 35 Employers felt they would be unable to pay poten-
tially enormous pension liabilities for which they had made no provi-
sions at all."36 Employees challenged the MOI's interpretation in the
Courts. In March 1986, the ROC Supreme Court found the MOI in-
terpretation invalid in its retroactive application of the LSL.137
Employers objected not only to the MOI's extremely broad inter-
pretation of the LSL provisions, but also protested that they would be-
come uncompetitive in international markets if they were forced to fi-
nance pensions and other benefits called for by the LSL. These claims
gained credence during the recession Taiwan experienced in the early
1980s. As a result, the authorities delayed implementation of the pen-
sion provisions as well as the OWSF until late 1986.138 The Executive
Yuan also issued a ruling exempting most bonus and subsidy payments
from wages for purposes of calculating pension contributions."3 9 Man-
agement resistance to paying the new benefits is so great that some
observers express concern that workers will be fraudulently deprived of
132. China Econ. News Daily, June 17, 1986, at 2.
133. Id.




138. Id. at 12.
139. FAR E. EcoN. REV., Oct. 17, 1986, at 68.
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their benefits.140 Observers anticipate that some employers will termi-
nate their employees who would be covered by the LSL and rehire only
temporary employees.' Another concern, which is justified given the
state of accounting practices in Taiwan, is that employers will simply
evade making the contributions at all.1' 2 The fundamental problem
with the generous new pension provisions of the LSL is the same as
that with the occupational health and safety provisions: ineffective
enforcement. 4"
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The formation of an officially recognized opposition party has been
a major political issue in Taiwan for over a decade. The formation of
new opposition parties is officially prohibited and this prohibition has
not been lifted with the repeal of martial law. However, a Civic Orga-
nizations Law has been proposed which would allow new opposition
parties to form and is expected to become law before the end of 1988.
In 1977, notwithstanding the prohibition, an informal opposition
party formed. This informal opposition was known as the "Tangwai,"
which literally means "outside the party" (i.e., outside the KMT). In
spite of several periods of suppression since its formation, the Tangwai
continues to grow.' 44 In recent elections, the Tangwai received 25-30%
of the popular vote and several seats in the Legislative Yuan. 4 5
In 1986, the government and the Tangwai began tentative negotia-
tions which would have resulted in recognition of the opposition as a
political party. Although the talks broke down, the Tangwai formed a
party named the Democratic Progress Party ("DPP"). The DPP won
several seats in the November 1986 elections. In particular, the DPP
won two seats reserved to represent organized labor as a group rather
than a particular geographic district.
The KMT authorities were surprised at the upset of the two offi-
cial KMT candidates (who were also the leaders of the Chinese Feder-
ation of Labor and the Taiwan Federation of Labor). The election of
opposition candidates to these positions was seen as a direct expression
of the discontent of workers with the structure of organized labor in
140. Asia Resource Center Petition, supra note 20, at 8.
141. Id.
142. China Econ. News Weekly, Nov. 10, 1986, at 4. Fraudulent accounting prac-
tices are widespread in Taiwan and reflect endemic corporate tax evasion.
143. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 36, at 710; AFL-CIO Petition, supra note
55, at 21.
144. GOLD, supra note 10, at 116-20.
145. Ya-Li Yu, supra note 17, at 1090.
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Taiwan.
The authorities responded in several ways. One was the announce-
ment that labor affairs would be taken out of the MOI and a new La-
bor Council, directly under the Executive Yuan, would be formed to
handle them. This Labor Council was established on August 1, 1987.
There is also discussion of rewriting existing labor laws and possibly
granting workers the right to strike.
A foreign journalist residing in Taipei noted another response. In
January 1987, pro-KMT newspapers in Taiwan began carrying stories
of labor disturbances for the first time."46 Observers of the Taiwan do-
mestic situation agree that there have always been minor labor distur-
bances in Taiwan, in spite of any prohibition on striking. 47 However,
no disturbances ever reached proportions where they might be called a
strike, or at least, no such disturbances have been covered in the pro-
KMT press.148
In 1986, as the opposition formally organized as a political party
in spite of the official prohibition, President Chiang Ch'ing-kuo moved
to deflate public support for the opposition by announcing his intention
to repeal martial law. 49 Although it has been the subject of heated
disagreement within the KMT, enlightened progressives within the gov-
ernment managed to push through the repeal on July 15, 1987.150 Even
though repeal of martial law was a major party platform of the DPP in
the November 1986 elections, DPP legislators strenuously objected to
the KMT's proposal for the repeal. In particular, the DPP objected
that repeal of martial law was simultaneous with the promulgation of
the National Security Law. According to the DPP, the National Secur-
146. Although the press in Taiwan is formally independent of KMT control, the
authorities keep the press on a tight reign. The Taiwan Garrison Command actively
suppressed opposition publications under Martial Law. Publishers of the two largest
newspaper conglomerates in Taiwan sit on the Central Standing Committee of the
KMT and their publications are relied upon to reflect the official party line. In 1988,
this situation showed signs of changing. FAR E. EcON. REv., Feb. 11, 1988, at 12.
147. Letter from Fusen Hu, Labor Officer of CCNAA, to Chairman of GSP Sub-
committee, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (July 7, 1987) (enclosing the
CCNAA response to the unfavorable representation of labor rights in the ROC) (avail-
able from CCNAA). The CCNAA response to the unfavorable representation of labor
rights in the ROC, dated June 29, 1987, at 2, included the following statement:
"Strikes do take place from time to time though all parties concerned may even choose
not to call them so. Call it a strike or not, workers involved were not working, and
production stopped."
148. Interview with Carl Goldstein, Taiwan correspondent for FAR E. ECON. REV.
(March, 1987).
149. FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 30, 1986, at 28.
150. FAR E. ECON. REv., Jul. 30, 1987, at 18.
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ity Law differs little in substance to martial law. The terms of the Na-
tional Security Law are only declaratory, however, and cannot be en-
forced until separate enabling legislation is passed in the near future. It
is therefore impossible to determine whether the enforcement of the
National Security Law will differ significantly from the enforcement of
martial law. 1'
The DPP failed to maintain its position as the representative of
Taiwan's workers. The DPP spokesman on labor affairs shocked DPP
labor supporters by telling U.S. officials that Taiwan took good care of
its workers. 152 On December 5, 1987, labor activists and intellectuals
split with the DPP and formed a Labor Party. The party announced its
intention to become the main political vehicle for Taiwan's industrial
workforce although it remains to be seen whether it will mobilize wide
popular support. Given the hostility of the KMT to leftist organiza-
tions, the Labor Party has embraced private ownership of capital and
free enterprise as its basic philosophy. The political objectives of the
party include free unionism, opposition to discrimination against
women and minorities in the workplace, tighter enforcement of indus-
trial health and safety laws and financial and tax supports for small
and medium sized enterprises.1 53
In addition to the apparent discontent of the members of officially
recognized unions and the formation of an independent labor party,
some pressure on the KMT for reform has recently come from the U.S.
Congress. When the Trade Act of 1974, which provides the Genera-
lized System of Preferences ("GSP") for selected developing countries
was amended in 1984,15" Congress imposed certain requirements con-
cerning observance of human rights on recipient nations.1 55 Developing
countries will be denied GSP benefits if it is shown that the country
"has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally recog-
nized worker rights to workers" in the beneficiary developing coun-
try." The Trade Act as amended adopts standards for internationally
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recognized workers' rights as set by the International Labor Organiza-
tion of Geneva. 57 These include: the right of association, the right to
organize and bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced labor, a
minimum age for child labor and acceptable conditions of work with
respect to wages, hours and occupational health and safety.1
58
This provision is significant to the authorities in the ROC because
the ROC is and has been for several years, the largest recipient of
United States GSP benefits. " In 1985, petitions were lodged with the
U.S. Trade Representative by several interested parties such as the
AFL-CIO, the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Technical,
Salaried and Machine Workers and the Asia Resource Center alleging
that the ROC had not granted workers in Taiwan internationally rec-
ognized workers' rights.' Representatives of the ROC government
pointed to the recent promulgation of the LSL as evidence they were
taking steps to improve workers' rights in Taiwan.
The ROC's GSP beneficiary status was supported by the U.S.
State Department. The State Department's position was based on for-
eign policy concerns and on the interest of U.S. companies with opera-
tions in Taiwan. U.S. companies are among the largest exporters from
Taiwan to the U.S. and thus, among the largest beneficiaries of the
GSP program.' 6 '
Support in the U.S. for improved workers' rights in Taiwan is
therefore ambivalent at best. While U.S. labor organizations have been
active in calling attention to denial of workers' rights, 6 ' U.S. compa-
respect intellectual property rights or which fail to allow U.S. exporters reasonable
access to its own markets.
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nies which have made enormous investments in Taiwan have an inter-
est in the maintenance of the status quo. Given the close relationship
which 'remains between the U.S. and the ROC, in spite of the sever-
ance of formal diplomatic relations in 1979, and given recent develop-
ments in the ROC such as the repeal of martial law, it seems unlikely
that the U.S. Trade Representative will find that the ROC is not "tak-
ing steps" toward the recognition of workers' rights. The White House
announced on January 29, 1988 that Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan,
and South Korea would lose GSP status as of January 2, 1989.163 That
decision apparently was made because the four countries failed to ap-
preciate their currencies or take other measures to correct their chronic
trade surplus with the U.S.1 64
IV. CONCLUSION
A survey of labor laws and regulations in the ROC indicates that
workers are denied by statute, or by the accepted interpretation of stat-
ues, fundamental labor rights. The overwhelming desire of KMT lead-
ership for security, both from internal dissent and from external sub-
version, has seriously impaired workers' freedom of association and
their freedom to form independent labor organizations. The govern-
ment's rush for economic growth at any cost requires considerable sac-
rifices from workers in terms of free collective bargaining.
There are signs that the commitment of the leadership of the
KMT to maintaining security at all costs is diminishing. The increasing
tolerance towards political opposition in Taiwan and the repeal of mar-
tial law are encouraging. Increased popular participation in the politi-
cal process may well herald increased worker participation in the work-
place. However, the current situation in Taiwan is made up of too
many imponderables to venture an opinion as to whether the current
mood of reform will continue long enough to produce lasting results.
While Taiwan's economic miracle has been achieved at the cost of
serious environmental and occupational health and safety problems,
workers in Taiwan have also enjoyed a steadily improving standard of
living for the last thirty years. KMT leadership provided substantial
GSP protected countries lies in the exploitation of local workers-the denial of
both their labor rights and basic human rights. Although ostensibly intended to
aid in the economic and social development of third world countries, the GSP has
had the effect of worsening both the relative and absolute well-being of workers
both in the U.S. and in beneficiary countries. ,
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economic benefits to the people of Taiwan even in the absence of inde-
pendent labor organizations or broad political participation. In the
early decades, the legitimacy of the KMT regime on Taiwan was but-
tressed by constant reference to the policy of regaining control of main-
land China. As this objective gradually became more implausible, there
has been a shift in emphasis in favor of retaining power in Taiwan by
delivering economic benefits to the people of Taiwan. Direct controls in
the form of free elections and worker control of unions might secure
greater benefits but it cannot be denied that, indirectly, the working
people of Taiwan have come to exercise some control over their leaders.
Because of the ROC's precarious international position, there are
no clear alternatives to KMT rule. Voluntary unification with the PRC
would probably lower the standard of living in Taiwan. Conversely, the
possibility of an independent Taiwan is blocked by the threat of mili-
tary intervention by the PRC. Thus, KMT rule, based in theory on a
claim to be the sole legitimate government of all of China and in fact
on the ability to deliver a rising standard of living to the people of
Taiwan, offers at least the possibility of continuing gradual
improvements.
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